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COMMENT ON MQLITERNO, LEGAL EDUCATION,
EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION, AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
LANCE LIEBMAN

In attempting to predict and prescribe the future, my vision of
the recent history of legal education differs from Professor
Moliterno's in certain relevant ways.
I graduated from Law School in 1967. I learned largely
through doctrinal courses that delivered steady training in
thinking like a lawyer and information about areas of law. These
courses exposed me and my classmates to legal lingo and to the
standard types of legal arguments. We learned, largely by hearing the teacher and our fellow students, to make verbal moves
and to see the strengths and limitations of others' argumentation
skills and techniques. We also learned a great deal about how to
argue by dissecting the opinions of appellate judges.
In the three decades since I graduated, legal education has
changed-improved, in my opinion-in two different ways. First,
law professors have broadened and deepened the theoretical
stances from which legal dialogue and legal writing are evaluated and criticized.' Many of us do not see an independent science
of law.2 We instead consider legal questions as economists, philosophers, theologians, political activists, sociologists, and political scientists.3 Such professorial viewpoints expose students to
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. For a discussion of the importance and influence of an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and teaching the law, see Randy F. Kandel, Whither the
Legal Whale: Interdisciplinarityand the Socialization of ProfessionalIdentity, 27 LOY.
L-A. L. REV. 9 (1993); George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research
and the Industrial Structure-Of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge
Edwards, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1929 (1993).
2. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The
Law School As University, 33 J. LEG. EDUC. 437, 437 (1983) ("[Olne must reject the
notion that the legal system is somehow self-contained or self-sufficient . . ").
3. See, e.g., Kandel, supra note 1, at 10 (listing various professors' symposium
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many ways of thinking about questions that arise in class. Although their training is often superficial, they do see, and some
even become proficient in, various ways to think and argue
about legal questions.
Second, curricula have incorporated practice opportunities for
students. Columbia Law School employs ten percent of its faculty as clinical professors whose full-time job is to supervise eight
students each per semester.4 Various clinical courses guide the
students into the profession by taking steps that resemble medical students' first practice experiences. Also at Columbia, recent
years have seen a substantial increase in simulation-based instruction. Columbia's curriculum has expanded to include such
things as: the week-long intensive ethics experience for thirdyear students;5 many trial practice sections;6 and four sections
of a simulation-based course in negotiation.7 Additional efforts
are currently on the drawing board.
Perhaps because I am twelve years older than Jim Moliterno,
I see more change and more improvement in legal education
than Jim observes. Tension exists precisely because law schools
now better serve as centers for the academic study of law and
are better at professional training. Of course, funding problems
may constrain the growth of clinical teaching or even lead to its
retrenchment at some schools. What is important, however, is
that law schools will continue to look for teachers who do highquality economic, political, philosophical, and feminist analysis
of law; law schools will also feel obligated to give students their
first professional experience in a context that permits reflection
and supervision.
I see three directions in which reform of legal education
should, and can, progress.

essays addressing such topics as: law and bioethics, law and anthropology, law and
philosophy, law and sociology, law and economics, law and religion, law and history,
law and feminism, law and language, and law and literature).
4. See COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW BULLETIN

1996-97 at 3-4 (indicating that there were seven clinical professors out of 64 fulltime, non-emeritus professors).
5. Id. at 24.
6. See id. at 27.
7. See id.
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First, new technology has tremendous potential to improve
and streamline the process of teaching lawyering' The goal is
to provide the greatest practical amount of experience for a
student by requiring the student to take action and make decisions in a context that explores options and criticizes and weighs
choices. The computer effectively and efficiently presents situations and supplies individualized responses. Creating good
"games" requires superior intellectual skills, and it is not clear
how to obtain the intellectual investment. It seems likely, however, that most early-twenty-first-century law students will
receive a significant part of their instruction by computer or CD
ROM. Such high-tech instruction will play an important role in
answering Jim Moliterno's concern that individualized instruction-by way of live-client clinics-is too expensive.'
Second, the wall separating law schools from the profession
must be removed. The biggest difference between medical training and legal training is that the medical student moves gradually from classroom to laboratory to hospital. The teaching hospital is a place where senior physicians, young physicians, and
medical students coexist, allowing the untrained to observe the
experienced and, in the process, to learn by "doing" under supervision. Law students, too, are in practice situations. Columbia law students must meet a pro bono requirement. 10 At least
half of the students work after the first year of law school in a
legal setting, and nearly all do so after the second year. Students begin a bar exam course during their final semester and
move to it full-time when they complete their final in-school
examination.
Yet the profession and the law faculties do not coordinate
their mutual role of training new generations of lawyers. Schools
do not prepare students for their summer jobs and do not debrief
them afterward. Law firms assume that law schools teach very
little of what is useful, and, therefore, they invest substantial

8. For examples of the innovative ways in which computers recently have been

used in law school classrooms, see Laura Duncan, Computing the Future, CIn. DAILY
L. BULL., June 11, 1993, at 3.
9. See James Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional
Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71, 89 (1996).
10. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, supra note 4, at 24.
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revenues in in-house training." The MacCrate Report argues
that the law schools and the profession must jointly assume
educational responsibility." So far, little has happened that
represents a coordinated response to these needs.
Third, far more must be done to integrate the new higher
learning about law into the law school curriculum. Some have
remarked that a separation has developed between the analysis
of law done by leading professors and the analysis done by leading practitioners." Leaders at the antitrust or tax bar formerly
had more intellectual contact with professors in their field than
they do today. In truth, greater distance also exists between the
research done by professors and what is taught to law students.
Because the study of law requires no prerequisites, student
populations at the most selective law schools inevitably vary
widely in their level of prior preparation in, and their willingness to engage, economics, philosophy, statistics, and social
theory. I have learned a great deal from Columbia Law School's
ambitious recreation of its required ("foundation") curriculum,
which involves the addition of courses such as: law and economics (no longer required), foundations of the regulatory state, and
perspectives on legal thought. 4 A quarter-century ago, Charles
Haar and I struggled to include "perspectives" inserts among the
cases in a then-new Property casebook. 5 I remember the difficulty of shortening one of Bruce Ackerman's early articles without creating a caricature of Bruce's position." The best lawyers
in the future will likely understand intellectual approaches to
law in a manner more similar to that of their professors as compared to what current teaching achieves. To achieve that goal
within the constraints of today's law schools, however, will be a
challenge.
In his article, Jim Moliterno described and made a good case

11.

LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CON-

TINUUM, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR REP. 299-301,
314-16 (1992) (commonly referred to as the MacCrate Report).
12. Id. at 8, 285.
13. See id. at 4-6.
14. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, supra note 4, at 12-13.

15. See CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW (2d ed. 1985).
16. See id. at 258-62.
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for an expanded version of William and Mary's current sequential program-an imaginative synthesis of simulation and
externships.'1 With limited dollars, this seems an efficient undertaking. I have no doubt that it would positively add to conventional--even very good conventional-legal education.
I am so far unpersuaded, however, by Jim's diligent effort to
declare professional responsibility a better subject for these
educational methods than contracts or tax or family law. 8 In
any field of legal study, high-quality simulated exercises would
be tremendous pedagogical additions to case-based classroom
instruction. Students learn more by doing, so long as they are
"doing" the right things and getting the right feedback. Imagine
simulated tax law exercises, including simulated client interviews. Externships could follow. Just as the teaching hospital is
a good venue for learning pediatrics, surgery, and doctor-patient
relations, so simulation and live-client representation are appropriate for most substantive legal subjects, allowing the student
to study herself functioning as an attorney. Certainly live-client
and simulated exercises are vital if a school teaches interviewing, counselling, trial techniques, and appellate strategy.
I realize that many of these subjects can easily include professional responsibility ingredients; for example interviewing an income tax client can surely involve the student-lawyer confronting the issue of a client seeking to cross an ethical boundary. My
point is that I am not yet persuaded that reality or virtual reality especially suits teaching the important subject of professional
norms.
Just as those concerned with tax law will quickly say that
supervised practice experience does not make a complete tax
curriculum-also needed is rigorous study of the statute, the
regulations, and the court cases, as well as high-quality public
finance economics-so teaching professional responsibility to
students who "do" does not exhaust a school's possible obligations to this subject. The theoretical analysis of lawyer responsibility-the shape, structure, and boundaries of the profession of
law-is immensely serious, difficult, interesting, and dynamic.

17. Moliterno, supra note 9, at 106-12.
18. See id. at 100-06.
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First, students should learn the law of lawyering as a doctrinal
subject; a subject of importance to a larger percentage of them
than any other field. Second, students should study the subject
from the methodological perspectives of economists, sociologists,
and philosophers. Humanists and social scientists should analyze the legal profession and legal institutions as immensely
important parts of American public and private life. Third, students should receive live-client or simulated experiences that
permit them to confront the challenges that lawyers face, allowing them to reflect upon their own choices and actions before
they enter the real world where unreflective decisions can harm
clients, society, and themselves. 9 Columbia does the third of
these tolerably well and the first two very poorly.
Because the subject of lawyering has been insufficiently
taught and studied, and perhaps for other reasons as well,
young persons entering teaching rarely identify professional
responsibility as a field in which they wish to work. This $80
billion industry is insufficiently studied by economists and other
social scientists."° The study of such a huge profession's ethics
needs additional intellectual investment, including curricular
investment, of the "doctrine" and "theory" sort as well as of the
"reality teaching" type.
Jim Moliterno has seized brilliantly a substantial portion of
the resources of an excellent law school, is providing a significant portion of his school's curriculum in an innovative and
positive way," and (I very much hope) will generate teaching
materials that will be used at and will influence other schools.
Even Jim's innovative program is only a part of what advancing
the intellectual domain that concerns the American legal profession requires. The approach that Jim suggested has as much

19. Study and teaching in these ways may be particularly suited to joifit efforts
by law schools and the providers of legal services: law firms, government law offices,
corporate counsel offices. But collaborations of this sort are only good when there is
imagination, supervision, and coordination. I do not share Jim Moliterno's confidence
that externship teaching can be inexpensive yet high quality.
20. In 1991, legal services generated gross domestic product of $81.9 billion. Robert K. Yuskavage, Gross Product by Industry, 1988-91, SURV. OF CURRENT Bus., Nov.
1993, at 33, 38.
21. Moliterno, supra note 9, at 107-10.
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potential for other legitimate law school subjects as it does for
Professional Responsibility. I believe that his methods, done
properly, may well be more expensive than he has predicted. I
also predict more tension than he acknowledged as the multiple
legitimate objects of curricular investment compete for limited
resources. The good news is that things are happening in legal
education, and that we live in interesting times.

